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ABSTRACT
We study the production of knowledge when many researchers or inventors are involved, in a setting
where tensions can arise between individual public and private contributions. We first show that
without some kind of coordination, production of the public knowledge good (science or research
software or database) is sub-optimal. Then we demonstrate that if "lead" researchers are able to
establish a norm of contribution to the public good, a better outcome can be achieved, and we show
that the General Public License (GPL) used in the provision of open source software is one of such
mechanisms. Our results are then applied to the specific setting where the knowledge being produced
is software or a database that will be used by academic researchers and possibly by private firms,
using as an example a product familiar to economists, econometric software. We conclude by
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1  Introduction 
In the modern academic research setting, many disciplines produce software and 
databases as a by-product of their own activities and also use the software and data 
generated by others. As Dalle (2003) and Maurer (2002) have documented, many of these 
research products are distributed and transferred to others using institutions that range 
from commercial exploitation to “free” forms of open source. Many of the structures 
used in the latter case resemble the traditional ways in which the “Republic of Science” 
has ensured that research spillovers are available at low cost to all. But in some cases, 
moves toward closing the source code and commercial development take place, often 
resulting either in the disappearance of open source versions or in “forking”, where an 
open source solution survives simultaneously with the provision of a closed commercial 
version of the same product. This has also created tensions between the reward systems 
of the “Republic of Science” and the private sector, especially when the production of 
research software or the creation of scientific databases are carried out in academic and 
scientific research environments (see also Hall, 2004).  
As these inputs to scientific research have become more essential and their value 
has grown, a number of questions and problems have arisen surrounding their provision. 
How do we ensure that incentives are in place to encourage their supply? How does 
market and non-market production of these knowledge inputs interact? In this paper, we 
address some of these questions. We develop a framework that highlights the difficulties 
to sustain the production of knowledge when it is the outcome of a collective enterprise. 
Since the lack of coordination among the individual knowledge producers is typically 
seen as the culprit for the under-provision of public knowledge, the latter can be 
sustained by institutional devices that encourage such a coordination. A key idea of the 
paper is that the General Public License (GPL) used in the provision of open source Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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software is one of such mechanisms. We then discuss another limitation in the 
production of this type of knowledge. To make it useful for commercial or other goals, 
one needs complementary investments (e.g. development costs). If the knowledge is 
freely available there could be too many potential producers of such investments which 
reduces the incentives of all of them to make the investments in the first place. 
Paradoxically, if the knowledge was protected, its access would be more costly, which 
may produce the necessary rents to enhance the complementary investments. But 
protecting upstream knowledge has many drawbacks, and we argue that a more effective 
solution is to protect the downstream industry products. Finally, we discuss how our 
framework and predictions apply to the provision of scientific software and databases.  
An example of the difference between free and commercial software solutions 
that should be familiar to most economists and scientific researchers is the scientific 
typesetting and word processing package Tex.
1 This system and its associated set of 
fonts was originally the elegant invention of the Stanford computer scientist Donald 
Knuth, also famous as the author of the Art of Computer Programming, the first volume of 
which was published in 1969. Initially available on mainframes, and now widely 
distributed on UNIX and personal computer systems, TeX facilitated the creation of 
complex mathematical formulas in a word-processed manuscript and the subsequent 
production of typeset camera-ready output. It uses a set of text-based computer 
commands to accomplish this task rather than enabling users to enter their equations via 
the graphical WYSIWYG interface now familiar on the personal computer.
2 Although 
                                                 
1 This brief history of TeX is drawn from the TeX User’s Group website, http://www.tug.org. In 
giving a simplified overview, we have omitted the role played by useful programs based on TeX such as 
LaTeX, etc. See the website for more information. 
2 WYSIWYG is a widely used acronym in computer programming design that stands for “What 
You See Is What You Get”. Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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straightforward in concept, the command language is complex and not easily learned, 
especially if the user does not use it on a regular basis. Although many academic users 
still write in raw TeX in spite of the fact that they work on a system with a graphical 
interface such as Windows, there now exists a commercial program, Scientific Word, 
which provides a WYSIWYG environment for generating TeX documents, albeit at a 
considerable price when compared to the freely distributed original.  
This example illustrates several features of the academic provision of software 
that we will discuss in this paper.  First, it shows that there is willingness to pay for ease 
of software use even in the academic world and even if the software itself can be 
obtained for free. Second, the most common way in which software and databases are 
supplied to the academic market is a kind of hybrid between academic and commercial, 
where they are sold in a price-discriminatory way that preserves access for the majority of 
scientific users. Such products often begin as open source projects directed by a “lead” 
user, because the culture of open science is quite strong in the developers and 
participants. Nevertheless, they are eventually forced into the private sector as the market 
grows and non-developer users demand support, documentation, and enhancements to 
the ease of use.  
In the next section we discuss some basic aspects of the problem of creating 
incentives for the production of knowledge when many producers are involved. Section 
3 discusses our analytic framework which shows that without some kind of coordination, 
production of the public knowledge good (science or research software or database) is 
sub-optimal, and that the GPL can solve at least in part the problem. Section 4 focuses 
on complementary investments. Sections 5 and 6 apply our framework to the specific 
setting where the knowledge being produced is software or a database that will be used 
by academic researchers and possibly also by private firms, using as an example a product 
familiar to economists, econometric software. We conclude by discussing some of the Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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ways in which pricing can ameliorate the problem of providing these products to 
academic researchers. The Appendix develops the technical details of our model in 
Section 3.  
2  Incentives for Knowledge Production with Many Producers  
The design of incentive systems that reward inventors and knowledge producers and 
encourage dissemination of their output has been a familiar issue to economists and 
other scholars for a long time (e.g., Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962; Scotchmer, 1991). If 
anything, the issue has become more important today with the advent of the internet and 
other computer networking methods. The principal effect of the increase in computer 
networking and internet use is that it lowers the marginal cost of distributing codified 
knowledge to the point where it is essentially zero. This in turn has the potential to 
reduce incentives for production of such knowledge or to increase the demands of the 
producers for protection of their property rights to the knowledge. Hence there is a felt 
need for undertaking additional efforts to understand the production of knowledge, and 
for thinking about new approaches to policy. 
To address these issues, we must first ask what motivates the producers of 
knowledge. Key factors identified in the literature are curiosity and a taste for science, 
money, the desire for fame and reputation, and as a secondary goal, promotion or tenure 
(Stephan 1996). The latter two goals are usually achieved via priority in publication, that is, 
being the first to get a discovery into print. Although monetary income is clearly a partial 
motivation in the search for reputation and promotion, considerable evidence exists that 
for researchers in universities and public research organizations with some level of 
guaranteed income, the first motive − intellectual curiosity − is of overriding importance 
(e.g., Isabelle 2004). For this type of researcher, the desire for financial rewards is often 
driven by the desire to fund their own scientific research (Lee 2000) rather than by Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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consumption per se. Scientists’ motivations also are coloured by the culture in which they 
are embedded, with traditional norms giving way to a more market-oriented view among 
some younger scientists today (Isabelle 2004, Owen-Smith and Powell 2001). 
Several scholars (e.g., Merton, 1957 and 1968; David 1993) have described the 
two regimes that allocate resources for the creation of new knowledge: one is the system 
of granting intellectual property rights, as exemplified by modern patent and copyright 
systems, the other is the “open science” regime, as often found in the realm of “pure” 
scientific research and sometimes in realm of commercial technological innovation, often 
in infant industries (Allen 1983). Today we also see this system to a certain extent in the 
production of free and open source software. The first system assigns clear property 
rights to newly created knowledge that allow the exclusion of others from using that 
knowledge, as well as the trading and licensing of the knowledge. As is well-known, such 
a system provides powerful incentives for the creation of knowledge, at the cost of 
creating temporary monopolies that will tend to restrict output and raise price. 
Additionally, in such systems, the transaction costs of combining pieces of knowledge or 
building on another’s knowledge may be rather high, and in some cases achieving first or 
even second best incentives via ex post licensing may be impossible (Scotchmer 1991). 
The use of other firms’ knowledge output will often require payment or reciprocal cross-
licensing, which means negotiation costs have to be incurred. Finally, obtaining IP rights 
usually requires publication, but only of codified knowledge, and trade secrecy protection 
is often used in addition. 
The second set of institutional arrangements, sometimes referred to as the norms 
governing the “Republic of Science,” generates incentives and rewards indirectly: the 
creation of new knowledge is rewarded by increased reputation, further access to 
research resources, and possible subsequent financial returns in the form of increased 
salary, prizes, and the like (Merton 1957, 1968). This system relies to some extent on the Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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fact that individuals often invent or create for nonpecuniary reasons like curiosity. 
Dissemination of research results and knowledge is achieved at relatively low cost, 
because assigning the “moral rights” to the first publisher of an addition to the body of 
knowledge gives creators an incentive to disseminate rapidly and broadly. Therefore, in 
this system the use of others’ output is encouraged and relatively cheap, with the cost 
being appropriate citation and possibly some reciprocity in sharing knowledge. But it is 
evident that this system cannot capture the same level of private economic returns for 
the creation of knowledge. Inventors must either donate their work or receive 
compensation as clients of public or private patrons.
3 
Hall (2004) highlights the tension that arises when these two systems come up 
against each other. For example, it is common for the difference in norms and lack of 
understanding of the potential partner’s needs and goals to produce breakdowns in 
negotiations between industry and academe. These breakdowns can have an economic as 
well as cultural cause, as shown by Anton and Yao (2002) in a study of contracting under 
asymmetric information about the value of the knowledge to be exchanged. In addition 
there is the simple fact that both systems rely on reciprocal behaviour between both 
parties to a knowledge exchange, so that contracting between participants in the two 
difference systems becomes subject to misunderstanding or worse. This is illustrated by 
the reaction of the genomic industry in the U.S. when asked to take out licenses to 
university-generated technology: once the university starts acting like a private sector 
firm, there is a temptation to start charging them for the use of the outputs of industry 
research, and consequent negative effects on researchers who still believed themselves 
part of the “open science” regime. 
                                                 
3 We can subsume both cases as instances of “patronage” – self patronage of the donated efforts 
is a special case of this. See David (1993) and Dasgupta and David (1994). Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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In fact, notice should also be taken of an important variation of the “open 
science” regime for the sharing of knowledge production outputs, one which has existed 
many times in the development of industry throughout history: the free exchange and 
spillover of knowledge via personnel contact and movement, as well as reverse 
engineering, without resort to intellectual property protection. This has become known 
as the system for “collective invention”. Examples include the collective invention in the 
steel and iron industry described by Allen (1983) (see also Von Hippel, 1987), the 
development of the semiconductor industry in Silicon Valley (Hall and Ziedonis 2001), 
the silk industry in Lyons during the ancien regime that was described by Foray and Hilaire-
Perez (2004), and the collective activities of communities of users who freely distribute 
information to the manufacturers (Harhoff, Henkel, and Von Hippel, 2003). In these 
environments, most of which are geographically localized innovation areas with social as 
well as business relationships that build trust (or at least knowledge of whom to trust), 
the incentive system for the production and exchange of knowledge is somewhat different 
than in either of the other two systems.  
The first and most obvious difference is that the production of “research” in the 
industry setting is supported not by public or private patronage but by commercial firms 
that finance it by the sale of end products that incorporate their discovery. Because 
rewards come from the sale of products rather than information itself, as they do in the 
conventional IP-based system, the sharing of information about incremental innovations 
is motivated by different considerations than in the case of the OS regime. Although 
priority is not per se valuable except in the sense that it may confer lead time for 
production, shared knowledge, especially about incremental improvements to a complex 
product, is perceived to be useful and essential for the progress of the entire industry 
including the firm that shares the knowledge. When an industry is advancing and growing 
rapidly, the desire to exclude competitors from the marketplace is not as strong as when Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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an industry reaches maturity. An implication is that this form of free exchange of 
knowledge tends to collapse, or is unstable over time, as has happened in many of the 
historical examples. In the next section we will try to capture this idea and discuss some 
conditions under which the academic or industry-based OS regime might break down.  
3  “Public Domain” vs. “Proprietary” Research  
3.1  Configuration of the Open Source Equilibrium   
When do the different systems of knowledge generation and sharing discussed in the 
previous section develop, and when they might be expected to break down? In this 
section we address these questions. To make our argument more precise we provide a 
simple formalization in the Appendix. Below we discuss the intuitions and the 
implications of our model.  
As discussed in the previous section, many researchers face a trade-off. They can 
put a given research outcome in the public domain or seek private profits from it. As a 
stylized representation, in the former case they enjoy no economic rents, while in the 
latter they restrict public diffusion of their findings, seek property rights on them, and 
gain monetary income. We label the first mode as “public domain” (PD), and the second 
as “proprietary research” (PR). As also noted earlier, this framework encompasses many 
situations, such as academic scientists who could publish their research findings vis-à-vis 
holding patents or other property rights on them (Dasgupta and David, 1994); software 
developers who contribute to open source software as opposed to patenting their 
programs (Lerner and Tirole, 2002); user-inventors who transfer their inventions to the 
producers rather than protecting them as intellectual property and then selling them 
(Von Hippel, 1988; Von Hippel and Von Krogh, 2003; Harhoff, Henkel, and Von 
Hippel, 2003); communities of technologists who coordinate to share their “collective” Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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inventions, as opposed to keeping their knowledge secret (Allen, 1983; Nuvolari, 2004; 
Foray and Hilaire-Perez, 2004).  
Like any individuals, researchers gain utility from monetary income, but their 
utility also increases with the stock of public domain (PD) knowledge. Their benefits 
from this knowledge are from two sources: their own contributions and other 
contributions. First, they enjoy utility from the fact that they contribute to public 
knowledge. This is because they “like” contributing to PD knowledge per se, or because 
they enjoy utility from a larger stock of public knowledge and hence they wish to 
contribute to its increase. There could also be instrumental reasons. Contribution to 
public knowledge makes their research visible, which provides fame, glory or potential 
future monetary incomes in the form of increased salary, funding for their research, or 
consultancy. Second, the researchers gain utility from the fact that others contribute to 
PD knowledge. Again this could be because they care about the state of public 
knowledge. In addition, a greater stock of public knowledge provides a larger basis for 
their own research, which implies that, other things being equal, they would like others 
contribute to it.  
We assume that the benefits from the contributions of other researchers to 
public knowledge will be enjoyed whether one works under PD or in the proprietary 
research regime (PR). This implies that a researcher will operate under PD if the benefit 
that she enjoys from her public contribution is higher than the foregone monetary 
income from not privatizing her findings. In the Appendix we show that in equilibrium 
this is true of all the researchers that operate under PD, while the opposite is true of the 
researchers that operate under PR. In general, the equilibrium will involve a share of 
researchers operating under PD or PR that is between 0 and 1. The first prediction of 
our analysis is then that the two regimes can co-exist, as we shall also see with some 
examples in the following sections.  Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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Our model also predicts that new profit opportunities common to all the 
researchers in a field reduce the share of PD researchers in equilibrium, while a stronger 
taste for research (e.g. because of particular systems of academic values) raises it. There is 
fairly widespread evidence that in fields like software or biotechnology there are 
pressures on academic researchers to place their findings in a proprietary regime. Also, 
our examples in the later sections show that shifts from academic to commercial 
software are more prominent when the market demand for the products increase, which 
raises the profitability of the programming efforts. Finally, there are several accounts of 
the fact that tension between industrial research and academic norms become higher if 
university access to IPRs is increased (Cohen et al 1998; Hall, Link, and Scott 2001; 
Hertzfeld, Link, and Vonortas 2004; Cohen, Florida, and Randazzese 2004). As these 
authors report, such tension has already been observed in the US, as the latter country 
has pioneered the trend towards stronger IPRs and the use of intellectual property 
protection by universities, but it is becoming more pronounced in Europe as well, as 
European universities follow the path opened up by the US system (Geuna and Nesta 
2004). Collins and Wakoh (1999) describe similar changes in Japan and describe how the 
regime shift to patenting by universities is inconsistent with the previous system of 
collaborative research with industry in that country, implying increasing stress for the 
system.  
3.2   Instability of Open Source Production  
Our model also shows that the only way to get a stable equilibrium configuration with 
individuals operating under open sharing rules is when there is coordination among 
them. Otherwise, the sharing (cooperative) equilibrium tends to break down because 
some individuals find it in their interest to defect. The instability of the open sharing 
equilibrium is just an application of the famous principle by Mancur Olson (1971) that Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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without coordination the collective action is hard to sustain. Our contribution is simply 
to highlight that Mancur Olson’s insight finds application to the analysis of the instability 
of open systems. When many researchers contribute to PD knowledge, an individual 
deviation to PR is typically negligible compared to the (discrete) jump in income offered 
by proprietary regime. Thus, individually, the researchers always have an incentive to 
deviate.  
Another way to see this point is that some of the tensions that are created in the 
open research systems can be attributed to the asymmetry between the open and the 
proprietary mode. The researchers shift to proprietary research only if individually 
profitable. By contrast, in the collective production of knowledge, a desirable individual 
outcome depends on the actions of others. In our framework this is because the 
individuals care about the fact that others contribute to the stock of knowledge, and 
because this may affect their benefits from their own contribution as well. As we show in 
the Appendix, this creates situations in which the lack of coordination produces 
individual incentives to deviate in spite of the fact that collectively the researchers would 
like to produce under PD. The intuition is that a group of individuals can produce a 
sizable increase in the stock of public knowledge if they jointly deviate from the PR 
regime. Thus, if there was commitment among them to stay with the PD rules, they 
could be better off than with private profits. In turn, this is because the larger the group 
of people who deviate in a coordinated fashion, the higher the impact on the public 
knowledge good, while the private profits, which do not depend as much on the 
collective action, are not affected substantially by the joint movement of researchers 
from one regime to the other. But even if they all prefer to stay with the PD system, 
because of the larger impact of their PD contributions as a group, individually they have 
an incentive to deviate because if the others stay with PD, the individual deviation does 
not subtract that much from public knowledge, while it does produce a discrete jump in Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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the individual’s private income. Since everyone knows that everyone else faces this 
tension, and could deviate, it will be difficult to keep the researchers under the PD 
system unless some explicit coordination or other mechanism is in place.  
Ultimately, this asymmetry in the stability of the two configurations suggests why 
there may be a tendency to move from public to private production of knowledge, while 
it is much harder to move back from private to public.. The implication is that there is 
little need for policy if more proprietary research is desirable, as the latter is likely to arise 
naturally from the individual actions. By contrast, policy or institutional devices that 
could sustain the right amount of coordination is crucial if the system underinvests in 
knowledge that is placed in the public domain. 
3.3  Generalized Public License (Copyleft) as a Coordination Device 
The Generalized Public License (GPL) used in open source software can be an effective 
mechanism for obtaining the required coordination. As discussed by Lerner and Tirole 
(2002) inter alia, with a GPL the producer of an open source program requires that all 
modifications and improvements of the program is subject to the same rules of 
openness, most notably the source code of all the modifications ought to be made 
publicly available like the original program.
4 To see how a GPL provides the 
coordination to solve the Mancur Olson problem, imagine the following situation. There 
is one researcher who considers whether to launch a new project or not. We call her the 
“originator”. She knows that if she launches the project, others may follow with 
additional contributions. The latter are the “contributors”. If the originator attaches a 
                                                 
4 There are many variants of a GPL, with different possibilities of privatizing future contributions. 
See for example Lerner and Tirole (2005). However, in this paper we want to focus on some broad 
features of the effect of a GPL as a coordinating device, and therefore we simply consider the extreme case 
in which the GPL prevents any privatization of the future contributions. Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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GPL to the project, the contributors can only join under PD. If no GPL is attached they 
have the option to privatize their contribution. Of course, once (and if) the project is 
launched, the contributors always have the option not to join the project and work on 
some alternative activities. Given the expected behavior of the contributors, the 
originator will choose whether to launch the project or not. She also has potential 
alternatives. If she decides to launch it she will choose whether to put her contribution 
under PD or PR, and if the former she considers whether to attach a GPL to the project. 
We can safely rule out the possibility that the originator operates under PR and attaches a 
GPL to the project. It will be odd to think that she can enforce open source behavior 
given that she does not abide by the same rules. 
The key implications of a GPL is that it increases the number of contributors 
operating under PD. The intuition, which we formalize in the Appendix, is simple. 
Without a GPL the contributors have three choices: work on the project under PD or 
under PR, or not join because they have better alternatives. PD contributors to the 
project will still choose PD if a GPL is imposed. If they preferred PD over both PR and 
other alternatives, they will still prefer PD if the PR option is ruled out. Those who did 
not join the project will not join with a GPL either. They preferred their alternatives over 
PD and PR, and will still prefer them if PR is not an option. Finally, some of those who 
joined under PR will join under PD instead, while others who joined under PR will no 
longer join the project. As a result, a GPL reduces the total number of researchers who 
join the project, but raises the number of researchers working under PD. The reduced 
number of participants is consistent with the fact that the GPL is a restriction on the 
behavior of the researchers. However, this is a small cost to the public diffusion of 
knowledge because those who no longer participate would have not joined under PD. By 
contrast, the GPL encourages some researchers who would not have published their 
results without the GPL to do so.  Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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Given the behavior of the contributors, will the originator launch the project and 
issue a GPL? We know that the originator, like any other researcher, enjoys greater utility 
from a larger size of the public knowledge stock. At the same time, she enjoys utility 
from monetary income or, as we noted, from alternative projects. Here we want to 
compare her choice when she can employ a GPL vis-à-vis a world in which there is no 
GPL. With a GPL she knows that the number of contributors to public knowledge 
increases, which in turn increases the size of the expected public knowledge stock when 
compared to a no-GPL case. As a result, when choosing whether to launch the project 
under PD with a GPL, under PD and no GPL, under PR, or work on alternative 
projects, she knows that the GPL choice raises the future public knowledge stock in the 
area while not raising her monetary income from the project or her utility from 
alternatives. This makes it more likely that the originator will choose to work on the 
project under PD cum GPL. More generally, a GPL will increase the number of projects 
launched under PD and the size of the public knowledge contributions.  
To summarize, the way the GPL works is by giving rise to an implicit 
coordination among a larger number of researchers to work on PD. The originator 
knows that there will be researchers who would prefer PR but choose PD if the former 
opportunity is not available, while all those who would choose PD will stick to it in any 
case. This enlarges the number of expected PD researchers, thereby placing greater 
advantages on the PD choice. Our intuition is that those with a strong taste for PD 
research will always work under PD, whether there is a GPL or not. By contrast, those 
with a high opportunity cost will never join the project. But those who have a small 
opportunity cost, and a weak taste for PD research might contribute via PD if a GPL is 
introduced. The GPL then lures people who are on the border between doing PD 
research on the project or not. For example, a GPL may be crucial to enhance the 
participation under PD of young researcher, who do not have significant opportunity Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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costs (e.g. because they do not yet have high external visibility), but who do not have a 
strong taste for PD research either, and hence would privatize their findings if profitable 
to do so. There might also be dynamic implications − e.g. the GPL helps young 
researchers to “acquire” a taste for PD research. This might help create a system of 
norms and values for public research that could sustain the collective action. We leave a 
more thorough assessment of such dynamic implications to future research. 
3.4  Nature and Consequences of the GPL Coordination 
A GPL is most effective as a coordination device when the opportunity cost of the 
individual researchers and the private profits from contributing to the project, are not 
positively correlated. Suppose that they were. This could arise because there is some 
common element between the two factors. For example, an individual researcher could 
be effective in commercializing knowledge in any field because he belongs to institutions 
(university or other) that encourage the commercialization of knowledge. In this case, the 
contributors to the project, who have low opportunity costs, also have low private profits 
from contributing to the project via PR. A GPL would not make a big difference because 
a very large fraction of the contributors to the project will do so under PD since their 
private rewards are low in any case. Hence, a GPL induces few researchers to switch 
from PR to PD. In turn, this has a small effect on the choice of the originator to launch 
the project under PD vis-à-vis PR because the number of additional PD contributors 
with a GPL is small. By contrast, if they are not positively correlated, some of the 
contributors to the project, who have low opportunity cost, will have high private 
rewards from PR. They could be encouraged by a GPL to switch to PD. As a result, the 
number of PD contributors could be sizably different with a GPL, with implied greater 
opportunities for PD rather than PR research. Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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The independence between the opportunity cost and the private rewards, as 
opposed to positive correlation, may be associated with the novelty of the project. When 
the projects are in new areas, the opportunities of the individuals may change 
substantially, and the researchers who might profit the most from the new projects can 
be different from those who benefited in the old projects. New skills, or new forms of 
learning are necessary in the new fields, and the people who have made substantial 
investments in the old projects may have greater difficulties in the new areas. (See, for 
example, Levinthal and March, 1993.) In these cases, researchers with low opportunity 
costs may instead find that they have great opportunities to commercialize knowledge in 
the new fields (high private rewards). Thus, the GPL is more likely to be a useful 
coordination device when the project is in a new field rather than an incrementally 
different one from previous projects, and when it is socially desirable to run these 
projects under PD. 
Our mechanism relies on the fact that there is enforcement of the GPL. But can 
the copy left system be enforced? In some settings people seem to abide by the copyleft 
rules, as Lerner and Tirole (2002) have noted, in spite of the lack of legal enforcement. In 
many situations, there may be a reputation effect involved when the copyleft agreement 
is not complied with. In this respect, the reason why a copyleft license may be useful is 
that without it, it may not be clear to the additional contributors whether the intention of 
the initial developers of the project was to keep it under PD or not. But if the will is 
made explicit, deviations may be seen as an obvious and explicit challenge to the social 
norms, and this may be sanctioned by the community. The GPL then acts as a signal that 
clears the stage from potential ambiguities about individual behavior and the respect of 
the social norms. Even in science, if a researcher developed a certain result, others may 
build on it, and privatize their contributions. This might be seen as a deviation from the 
social norms. While this behavior could be sanctioned, according to the strength with Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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which the norms of open science are embedded in and pursued by the community, with 
no explicit indication that the original contributor did not want future results from her 
discoveries to be used for private purposes, the justification for the sanctions or the need 
for them can be more ambiguous. 
A GPL removes ambiguity about the original intentions of the developers, and 
any behavior that contradicts the GPL is more clearly seen as not proper. This reduces 
privatization of future contributions compared to a situation with no GPL, increases the 
expectations that more researcher will make their knowledge public, and, other things 
being equal, creates greater incentives to make projects public in the first place. It is in 
this respect that we think that explicit indications of the norms may be a stronger signal 
than the mere reliance on the unwritten norms of open science or open source software. 
A related point is that the literature has typically been concerned with the need to 
protect the private property of knowledge when this is necessary to enhance the 
incentives to innovate. The inherent assumption is that when it is not privately protected, 
the knowledge is by default public, and it enriches the public domain. Yet, our model 
points out that this is not really true. The public nature of knowledge needs itself to be 
protected when commitments to the production of knowledge in the public domain is 
socially desirable. In other words, there is a need for making it explicit that the 
knowledge has to remain public, and this calls for positive actions and institutions to 
protect it. By not allowing for private property rights on some body of knowledge is not 
equivalent to assuming that the knowledge will be in the public domain. One may then 
need to assign property rights not just to private agents, but also to the public. For 
example, the IPRs are typically thought as being property rights to private agents. But we 
also need to have institutions that preserve the public character of knowledge. The 
copyleft license is a beautiful example of this institutional device. A natural policy Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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suggestion is therefore to make it legal and enforceable as copyright, patents and other 
private-based IPRs. 
4  Complementary investments in open source production 
Another feature of traditional open source or academic software production that we 
alluded to in the introduction is that it normally requires additional investments that 
enhance the usefulness and value of the scattered individual contributions, or it simply 
requires investments to combine them. For example, while several individuals can 
contribute to the development of a whole body of scientific knowledge, there must be 
some stage in which the “pieces” are combined into useful products, systems, or 
transferable knowledge. Some scientists or most likely some specialized agents, i.e. 
academic licensing offices or firms, normally perform this function. A typical example is 
when scientific knowledge needs substantial downstream investments to become 
economically useful technologies or commercializable products. Thursby, Jensen, and 
Thursby (2001) report that this is often the case for university research outputs. The 
latter activities are normally performed by firms. In software, additional investments are 
often required to enhance the usability of the software for those who did not develop it, 
and to produce documentation and support. The need for additional investments in open 
source production, or more generally in tasks that rely on public domain knowledge, has 
some specific implications that we want to discuss in this section.  
The problem is that the (downstream) “assembling” agent needs some profits in 
order to carry out the investments that are necessary to produce the complementary 
downstream assets of the good. Since the downstream assembling agents are typically 
firms, we now refer to them as the latter. There are two questions. First, the firm needs 
to obtain some economic returns to finance its investment. Clearly, there are many ways 
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sufficient to make the necessary investments but not high enough to produce serious 
extra-normal profits. However, it would be difficult for the firm to obtain such rents if it 
operated under perfect competition, or if it operated under an open, public domain 
system itself.  
The second question is more subtle. The firm uses the public domain 
contributions of the individual agents (software programmers, scientists, etc.) as inputs in 
its production process. If these contributions are freely available in the public domain, 
and particularly they are not available on an exclusive basis, many downstream firms can 
make use of them. As a result, the downstream production can easily become a free 
entry, perfectly competitive world, with many firms having access to the widely available 
knowledge inputs. If so, each firm could not make enough rents to carry out the 
complementary investments. This would be even harder for the individual knowledge 
producers who are normally scattered and have no resources to cover the fixed set-up 
costs for the downstream investments. The final implication is that the downstream 
investments will not be undertaken, or they will be insufficient. Of course, there can be 
other factors that would provide the firms with barriers to entry, thereby ensuring that 
they can enjoy some rents to make their investments. However, in productions where the 
knowledge inputs are crucial (e.g. software), the inability to use them somewhat 
exclusively can generate enough threats of widespread entry and excessive competition to 
discourage the complementary investments.  
Paradoxically, if the knowledge inputs were produced under proprietary rules, the 
producers of them could charge monopoly prices (e.g. because they could obtain an 
exclusive license), or at least enjoy some positive price cost margins. This raises the costs 
of the inputs. In turn, this heightens barriers to entry in the downstream sector, and 
adjusts the level of downstream investment upward. In other words, if the inputs are 
freely available there could be excessive downstream competition, which may limit the Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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complementary investments. If they are offered under proprietary rules, the costs of 
acquiring the inputs are higher, which curbs entry and competition, and allows the 
downstream firms to make enough rents to carry out such investments.
5 
But the privatization of the upstream inputs has several limitations. For one, as 
Heller and Eisenberg (1998) have noted, the complementarity among the “pieces” of 
upstream knowledge produced by the different individuals can give rise to the so-called 
problem of the anti-commons. That is, after all the other rights have been collected 
under a unique proprietorship, the final owner of a set of complementary inputs can 
enjoy enormous monopoly power. This is because by withholding his own contribution, 
he can forestall the realization of the whole technology, especially when the 
complementarity is so tight that each individual contribution is crucial to make the whole 
system work. The possibility of ex-post hold-up can discourage the effort to collect all 
the complementary rights ex-ante, and therefore prevent the development of the 
technology. Another limitation of the privatization of the upstream inputs is the one 
discussed in the previous section. With copyleft agreements, more people can contribute 
to the public good. The decentralized nature of the process by which scientists or open 
source software producers operate has typically implied that the network of public 
contributors to a given field can be so large that the overall improvements can be higher 
than what can be obtained within individual organizations, including quite large ones. 
Some evidence that open source projects also increase the quality of software output has 
been supplied by Kuan (2002). 
One solution to the problem of paying for complementary downstream 
investment is allowing for property rights, and particularly intellectual property rights, on 
                                                 
5 This argument should be familiar as it is the same as the argument used by some to justify Bayh-
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the innovations of the downstream producer. This would of course raise its monopoly 
power and therefore curb excessive competition. At the same time, it avoids attaching 
IPRs to pieces of upstream knowledge thereby giving rise to the problems of the anti-
commons, or to reduced quality of the upstream knowledge. In addition, the downstream 
producer would enjoy rights on features of the innovation that are closer to his own real 
contribution to the project, that is the development of specific downstream investments. 
Clearly, this also implies that the IPRs thus offered are likely to be more narrow, as they 
apply to downstream innovations as opposed to potentially general pieces of knowledge 
upstream. At the same time, they are not likely to be as narrow as in the case of small 
individual contributions to an open software module or a minor contribution to a 
scientific field, which can give rise to the fragmentation and hold-up problems discussed 
earlier.  
5  Academic software and databases 
In this section we draw some implications for the provision of scientific software and 
databases from the model and discussion in the previous two sections and then go on to 
discuss the possible modes in which they could be provided. First, this type of activity is 
more likely to be privatized than scientific research itself because there is greater and 
more focused market demand for the product, because norms are weaker due to weaker 
reputation effects, and because there are more potential users who are not inventors (and 
do not participate in the production of the good). Second, there could easily be both 
public and private provision at the same time, because such an equilibrium can be 
sustained when there are different communities of researchers with different norms. 
Third, as the market for a particular product grows, privatization is likely simply because 
the individual’s discrete return to privatization has increased. Finally, when the 
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downstream industry producing a final good based on those components implies too few 
profits for those undertaking investments that will enhance the value of the good. The 
final producers have to earn some rents to be able to make improvements beyond the 
mere availability of research inputs.  
The privatization of scientific databases and software has both advantages and 
disadvantages. With respect to the latter, David (2002) has emphasized the negative 
consequences of the privatization of scientific and technical data and information. One 
of the most important drawbacks is the increase in cost, sometimes substantial, to other 
scientists, researchers or software developers for use of the data in ways that might 
considerably enhance public domain knowledge. A second is that the value of such 
databases for scientific research is frequently enhanced by combining them or using them 
in their entirety for large scale statistical analysis, both of which activities are frequently 
limited when they are commercially provided.
6 Maurer (2002) gives a number of 
examples of privatized databases that have somewhat restricted access for academic 
researchers via their pricing structure or limitations on reuse of the data, such as Swiss-
PROT, Space Imaging Corporation, Incyte, and Celera. In this issue, David (2004) cites 
the case of the privatization of Landsat images under the Reagan administration, which 
led to a tenfold increase in the price of an image. In terms of our model, the potential to 
privatize scientific and technical data and information implies that a smaller number of 
researchers will contribute to the public good, with implied smaller stock of public 
knowledge being produced, which frustrates the launch of projects undertaken under 
public diffusion rules.  
                                                 
6 The usual commercial web-based provision of data is based on a model where the user 
constructs queries to access individual items in the database, like looking up a single word in the dictionary. Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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At the same time, a common argument in favor of the privatization of databases 
is that it helps in the development of a database producing industry, and more generally 
of an industry that employs these data as inputs. A similar argument can be used more 
broadly for software. For example, the recent European Directive that defines the terms 
for the patenting of software in Europe (European Commission, 2002) was largely 
justified by the argument that it would encourage the formation of a software industry in 
niches and specialized fields. Although it is sometimes true that exclusivity can have 
positive effects on the provision of information products, it is also true that there can be 
drawbacks like those suggested earlier (fragmentation of IPRs, little contribution to 
public domain knowledge, restricted access when welfare would be enhanced with 
unlimited access) to the privatization of knowledge inputs. At times, one can obtain 
similar advantages by allowing for the privatization of the outputs that can be generated 
using the database or software in question. That is, discovery of a useful application 
associated with a particular gene that is obtained by use of a genomic database is 
patentable in most countries. Or, in the case of the econometric software example used 
later in the paper, consulting firms such as Data Resources, Inc. or Chase Econometrics 
marketed the results of estimating econometric models using software whose origins 
were in the public domain. Following our earlier argument, by allowing for the 
privatization of the downstream output we make it possible for the industry to obtain 
enough rents to make the necessary complementary investments, while avoiding the 
limitations of privatizations in the upstream knowledge.  
There are, however, limits to this particular strategy for ensuring that scientific 
databases and software remain in the public domain while downstream industries based 
                                                                                                                                            
The pricing of such access reflects this design and is ill-suited (i.e., very costly) for researcher use in the 
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on these freely available discoveries can earn enough profit to cover their necessary 
investments. The difficulty of course is that in the case of generally useful information 
products, a firm selling a particular product, one whose inputs is an upstream academic 
product, has no reason to undertake the enhancements to the upstream product that 
would make it useful to others, unless the firm can sell the enhanced product in the 
marketplace. But this is what we were trying to avoid, and what is ruled out by a GPL. 
In fact, we now turn to a discussion of an alternative way in which such goods 
can be provided. The production of information products including software and 
databases has always been characterized by large fixed costs relative to marginal cost, but 
the cost disparity has grown since the advent of the internet. In practice, the only real 
marginal costs of distribution arise from two sources: the support offered to individual 
users (which in many cases has been converted into a fixed cost by requiring users to 
browse knowledge bases on the web) and the congestion costs that can occur on web 
servers if demand is too great.
7 Standard economic theory tells us that when the 
production function for a good is characterized by high fixed costs and low marginal 
costs, higher welfare can often be achieved by using discriminatory pricing, charging 
those with high willingness to pay more in order to offer the good to others at lower 
prices, thus increasing the overall quantity supplied. The problem with applying this 
mechanism generally is the difficulty of segmenting the markets successfully and of 
preventing resale.  
                                                 
7 This can be a real cost. The U.S. Patent Office, which provides a large patent database free to 
the public at large on its web server, has a notice prominently posted on the website saying that use of 
automated scripts to access large amounts of this data is prohibited and will be shut down, because of the 
negative impact this has on live individuals making queries.  Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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In the case of academic software and databases, however, it is quite common for 
successful price-discriminating strategies to be pursued.
8 There are several reasons for 
this: 1) segmentation is fairly easy because academics can be identified via addresses and 
institutional web information; 2) resale is difficult in the case of an information product 
that requires signing on to use it and also probably not very profitable; 3) the two 
markets (academic and commercial) have rather different tastes and attitudes toward 
technical support (especially towards the speed with which it is provided) so the 
necessary price discrimination is partly cost-based.  
6  Case Study: Econometric Software Packages 
As an illustration of the pattern of software development in the academic arena, we 
present some evidence about a type of product familiar to economists that has largely 
been developed in a university research environment but is now widely available from 
commercial firms: packaged econometric software. Our data are drawn primarily from 
the excellent surveys on the topic by Charles Renfro (2003a, b). We have supplemented it 
in places from the personal experience of one of the co-authors, who participated in the 
activity almost from its inception. The evidence supplied here can be considered 
illustrative rather than a formal statistical test of our model, since the sample is relatively 
small. To form a complete picture of the phenomenon of software and database 
commercialization in academia, it would be necessary to augment our study with other 
case studies. For example, see Maurer (2002) for a good review of methods of database 
provision in scientific research.  
                                                 
8 Another type of academic information product deserves mention here, academic journals. The 
private sector producers of these journals fact the same type of cost structure and have pursued a price 
discrimination strategy for many years, discriminating between library and personal use, and also among 
the income levels of the purchasers in some cases, where income level is proxied by country of origin.  Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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Econometric software is very much a by-product of the empirical economic 
research activity, which is conducted largely at universities and non-profit research 
institutions and to a lesser extent in the research departments of banks and brokerage 
houses. It is an essential tool for the implementation of statistical methods developed by 
econometric theorists, at least if these methods are to be used by more than a very few 
specialists. To a great extent, this type of software originated during the 1960s, when 
economists began to use computers rather than calculating machines for estimation, and 
for the first time had access to more data than could comfortably be manipulated by 
hand. The typical such package is implemented using a simple command language and 
enables the use of a variety of modeling, estimating and forecasting methods on datasets 
of varying magnitudes. Most of these packages are now available for use on personal 
computers, although their origins are often a mainframe computer implementation. For a 
complete history of the development of this software, see Renfro (2003b).  
Like most software, econometric software can be protected via various IP 
measures. The most important is a combination of copyright (for the specific 
implementation in source code of the methods provided) and trade secrecy (whereby 
only the “object” code, or machine-readable version of the code, is released to the 
public). This combination of IP protection has always been available but has only 
become widely used during the personal computer era. Prior to that time, distributors of 
academic software usually provided some form of copyrighted source code for local 
installation on mainframes, and relied on the fact that acquisition and maintenance were 
performed by institutions rather than a single individual to protect the code. This meant 
the source code could be modified for local use, but because the size of the potential 
market for “bootleg” copies of the source was rather small, piracy posed no serious 
competitive threat. The advent of the personal computer, which meant that in many 
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situation, and today the copyright-trade secrecy model is paramount.
9 Thus it is possible 
to argue that developments in computing have made the available IP protection in the 
academic software sector stronger at the same time that the potential market size grew, 
which our model implies will lead to more defection from public domain to proprietary 
rules.  
In Table 1, we show some statistics for the 30 packages identified by Renfro. The 
majority (20 of the 30) have their origins in academic research, either supported by grants 
or, in many cases, written as a by-product of thesis research on a student’s own time.
10 A 
further 5 were written specifically to support the modeling or research activities of a 
quasi-governmental organization such as a central bank. Only 5 were written with a 
specific commercial purpose in mind. Two of those 5 were forks of public domain 
programs, and in contrast to those of academic origin (whose earliest date of 
introduction was 1964 and whose average date was 1979), the earliest of the commercial 
programs was developed in 1981/82, a date that clearly coincides with the introduction 
of the non-hobbyist Personal Computer. Notwithstanding the academic research origin 
of most of these packages, today no less than 25 out of the 30 have been 
commercialized, with an average commercialization lag of 9 years.  
                                                 
9 In principle, in the aftermath of the (1981) Diamond v. Diehr decision, patent protection might 
also be available for some features of econometric software. In this area, as in many other software areas, 
there is tremendous resistance to this idea on the part of existing players, perhaps because they are well 
aware of the nightmare that might ensue if patent offices were unacquainted with prior art in econometrics 
(as is no doubt currently the case).  
10 Unfortunately, it is not possible to identify precisely the nature of the seed money support for 
many of the packages from the histories supplied in Renfro (2003a), other than the simple fact that the 
development took place at a university.  Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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Reading the histories of these packages supplied in Renfro (2003b), it becomes 
clear that although many of them had more than one contributor, normally there was a 
“lead user” who coordinated development, the identity of the “lead user” occasionally 
changing as time passed. Most of the packages had their origins in the solution of a 
specific research problem (e.g., the development of LIMDEP for estimation of the 
Nerlove and Press logit model, or the implementation of Hendry’s model development 
methodology in PCGive), but were developed, often through the efforts of others 
besides the initial inventor, into more general tools.  
These facts clearly reflect the development both of computing technology and of 
the market for these kinds of packages. As predicted by our model, growth in the market 
due to the availability of personal computers and the growth of the economics profession 
as whole has caused the early largely open source development model of the 1960s to 
become privatized. Nevertheless, there remain five programs that are supplied for free 
over the internet; of these three had their origins prior to 1980 and the other two are very 
recent. As our model in Section 3 suggests, not all of the individuals in the community 
shift to the private system, and the share of PD activities can well be between zero and 1. 
Interestingly, only one of the five is explicitly provided with a GPL attached. A quote 
from one of the author’s websites summarizes the motivation of those who make these 
programs available quite well: 
Why is EasyReg free? 
EasyReg was originally designed to promote my own research. I came 
to realize that getting my research published in econometric journals is not 
enough to get it used. But writing a program that only does the Bierens' stuff 
would not reach the new generation of economists and econometricians. 
Therefore, the program should contain more than only my econometric 
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When I taught econometrics at Southern Methodist University in Dallas 
in the period 1991-1996, I needed software that my graduate students could use 
for their exercises. The existing commercial software was not advanced enough, 
or too expensive, or both. Therefore, I added the econometric techniques that I 
taught in class first to SimplReg, and later on to EasyReg after I had bought 
Visual Basic 3. 
Meanwhile, working on EasyReg became a hobby: my favorite pastime 
during rainy weekends. 
When I moved to Penn State University, and made EasyReg 
downloadable from the web, people from all over the world, from developing 
countries in Asia and Africa as well as from western Europe and the USA, wrote 
me e-mails with econometric questions, suggestions for additions, or just saying 
"thank you". It appears that a lot of students and researchers have no access, or 
cannot afford access, to commercial econometrics software. By making EasyReg 
commercial I would therefore let these people down. 
There are also less altruistic reasons for keeping EasyReg free: 
 * By keeping EasyReg free my own econometric work incorporated in 
EasyReg will get the widest distribution. 
  * I will never be able to make enough money with a commercial 
version of EasyReg to be compensated for the time I have invested in it. 
 * Going commercial would leave me no time for my own research.11 
                                                 
11 This quotation is from Hermann Bierens’ website at 
http://econ.la.psu.edu/~hbierens/EASYREG.HTM Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
  30
Indeed, the second statement suggests that one reason to leave the software in 
the public domain was that the researcher’s commercial profits were not large enough. 
Likewise, the third statement suggests that the researcher cared about research and this 
was an important reason for not privatizing it. This is suggestive of the fact that the 
individual displayed a relatively low utility of commercial profits vis-à-vis his preference 
for research, which in turn affected his choice of staying public. In sum, the model’s 
prediction that both private and public modes of provision can co-exist when at least 
some individuals adhere to community norms is borne out, at least for one example. 
We also discussed explicitly the role of complementary services or enhanced 
features for non-inventor users in the provision of software. This is clearly one of the 
motivations behind commercialization, as was illustrated by the example of TeX. Table 
2, which is drawn from data in Renfro (2003a) attempts to give an impression of the 
differences between commercialized and non-commercialized software, admittedly using 
a rather small sample. To the extent that ease of use can be characterized by the full 
WIMP interface, there is no difference in the average performance of the two types of 
software. The main differences seems to be that the commercialized packages are larger 
and allow both more varied and more complex methods of interaction. Note especially 
the provision of a macro facility to run previously prepared programs, which occurs in 84 
per cent of the commercial programs, but only in 2 out of the 5 free programs. Such 
programs are likely to require more user support and documentation, because of their 
complexity, which increases the cost of remaining in the PD system. In short, as our 
earlier discussion suggested, a commercial operation, which is likely to imply higher 
profits, also provides a greater degree of additional investments beyond the mere 
availability of the research inputs.  
To summarize, the basic predictions of our model, which are that participants in 
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opportunities arise (e.g. the final demand for the product grows, or IP protection 
becomes available), are confirmed by this example. We also find some support for the 
fact that commercial operations are likely to undertake more complementary investments 
than pure open source operations. We do not find widespread use of the GPL idea in 
this particular niche market yet, although use of such a license could evolve. In the 
broader academic market, Maurer (2002) reports that a great variety of open source 
software licenses are in use, both viral (GPL, LPL) and non-viral (BSD, Apache-CMU).  
Finally, our model in Section 3 does not explicitly incorporate all the factors that 
are clearly important in the case of software and databases. Specifically, one area seems 
worthy of further development. We did not model the competitive behaviour of the 
downstream firms in the database and software industries. In practice, in some cases, 
there is competition to supply these goods, and in others, it is more common for the 
good to be supplied at prices set by a partially price-discriminating monopolist. We 
report the evidence on price-discrimination for our sample briefly here.  
Table 3 presents some very limited data for our sample of 30 econometric 
software packages. Of the 30, 5 are distributed freely and a further 8 are distributed as 
services, possibly bundled with consulting (such sales are essentially all commercial); this 
is the “added value” business model discussed earlier. Of the remaining 17, we were able 
to collect data from their websites for 15. Of these only 2 did not price discriminate, 3 
discriminate by the size and complexity of the problem that can be estimated, and 10 by 
the type of customer, academic or commercial.
12 A number of these packages were also 
                                                 
12 The average ratio of commercial to academic price was 1.7. Assuming an iso-elastic demand 
curve with elasticity η and letting s=share of commercial (high demand) customers, one can perform some 
very rough computations using the relationship ∆Q/Q = -η ∆P/P or (1-s) = η 0.7. If η=1, then the 
implied share of academic customers is 70 per cent. If the share of academic customers is only 30 per cent, 
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offered in “student” versions at substantially lower prices, segmenting the market even 
further. This evidence tends to confirm that in some cases, successful price 
discrimination is feasible and can be used to serve the academic market while covering 
some of the fixed costs via the commercial market.  
Although price discrimination is widely used in these markets, it does have some 
drawbacks as a solution to the problem of software provision. The most important one is 
that features important to academics or even programs important to academics may fail 
to be provided or maintained in areas where there either a very small commercial market 
or no market, because their willingness to pay for them is much lower. Obviously this is 
not a consequence of price discrimination per se, but simply of low willingness to pay; 
the solution is not to eliminate price discrimination, but to recognize that PD production 
of some of these goods is inevitable. For example, a database of elementary particle data 
has been maintained by an international consortium of particle physicists for many years. 
Clearly such a database has little commercial market.  
7  Conclusions 
Among the activities that constitute academic research, the production of software and 
databases for research purposes is likely to be especially subject to underprovision and 
privatization. The reason is that like most research activities, the public good nature of 
the output leads to free-riding, but that the usual norms and rewards of the “Republic of 
Science” are less available to their producer and maintainers, especially the latter. In this 
paper we presented a model that illustrates and formalizes these ideas and we used the 
model to show that the GPL can be a way to ensure provision of some of these goods, at 
least when the potential producers also want to consume them.  
Although in this paper we have emphasized the beneficial role of the GPL as a 
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point out that the GPL is not a panacea that works in all situations, and one of those 
situations may indeed be the production of scientific software and databases. One reason 
is that in practice it is difficult to distinguish between the “upstream” activities, which, as 
we discussed, ought to be produced under public domain, and the “downstream” ones. 
As we noted in the paper, the latter may entail important complementary investments. 
Therefore, they could be more effectively conducted under private rules that enable the 
producers to raise the rents that are necessary to perform such investments. But the GPL 
“forces” the contributors to work under public domain rules. If one cannot properly 
distinguish between upstream and downstream activities, the downstream activities, with 
implied complementary investments, will also be subject to public domain rules. This 
makes it more difficult to raise the resources to make the investments, with implied lower 
quality of the product.  
To return to the example of the introduction, the TeX User’s Group reports the 
following on their website in answer to the FAQ “If TeX is so good, how come it's 
free?”: 
It's free because Knuth chose to make it so. He is nevertheless apparently happy 
that others should earn money by selling TeX-based services and products. 
While several valuable TeX-related tools and packages are offered subject to 
restrictions imposed by the GNU General Public License ('Copyleft'), TeX itself 
is not subject to Copyleft. (http://www.tug.org) 
Thus part of the reason for the spread of TeX and its use by a larger number of 
researchers than just those who are especially computer-oriented is the fact that the lead 
user chose not to use the GPL to enforce the public domain, enabling commercial 
suppliers of TeX to offer easy-to-use versions and customer support.  
The so-called “lesser” GPL (LGPL) or other similar solutions can in part solve 
the problem. As discussed by Lerner and Tirole (2002), among others, the LGPL and Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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analogous arrangements make the public domain requirement less stringent. They allow 
for the mixing of public and private codes or modules of the program. As a result, the 
outcome of the process is more likely to depend on the private incentives to make things 
private or public, and this might encourage the acquisition of rents in the downstream 
activities. But following the logic of our model, as we allow for some degree of 
privatization, the efficacy of the license as a coordination mechanism is likely to diminish. 
We defer to future research a more thorough assessment of this trade-off. Here, 
however, we want to note that when the importance of complementary investments is 
higher, one would expect LPGL to be socially more desirable. The benefits of having the 
downstream investments may offset the disadvantage of a reduced coordination in the 
production of the public good. By contrast, when such investments are less important, or 
the separation between upstream and downstream activities can be made more clearly 
(and hence one can focus the GPL only on the former), a full GPL system is likely to be 
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A Model of Public Domain vs. Proprietary Research 
■ Set-up and equilibrium.  The total (indirect) utility of a researcher is U = z+θ·X(n-1), 
where X(n-1) is the stock of PD knowledge when n-1 other researchers work under PD, 
and θ ≥ 0 is a parameter that measures how much they care about the fact that others. 
Also, z  = x(n) if they work under PD, and z = π if they work under PR, where x(n) is the 
utility that the researcher gains from her public contribution (assumed to be a function of 
the number of PD researchers n) and π is the utility from the monetary income. We 
assume that x(n) ≥ 0, and we make no assumption about the impact of n on x. There 
could be diminishing returns, that is a larger n implies smaller utility from one’s own 
contribution (e.g. because fewer important discoveries can be made), or there could be 
externalities, viz. x increases with n, or both. Note that we assume that the researchers 
enjoy the public contribution of the others even if they work under PR. We could make 
more complicated assumptions, e.g. the impact of X(n-1) on utility is different according 
to whether the individual operates under PD or PR, but this will not affect our main 
results. 
  A researcher will produce under PD if π ≤ x(n). We assume that the individuals 
are heterogeneous in their preferences of PD vs. PR, viz. [π – x(n)] ∼ F(·|n), where the 
distribution function F depends on n because of x(n). In principle, the support of π – x(n) 
is the whole real line. The share of individuals working under PD is then F(0|n), and the 
equilibrium number of researcher n
e working under PD is defined by F(0|n
e) = n
e/N, 
where N is the total number of researchers in the community. This condition says that in 
equilibrium the share of researchers working under PD is equal to the share of Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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researchers whose utility from π is not larger than the utility of their contribution x(n
e) to 
PD.  
Figure 1 depicts our equilibria. Point E in Figure 1 is an equilibrium because if 
the number of researchers working under PD increases beyond n
e, the share of 
researchers with π – x(n) ≤ 0 increases by less than the share of researchers working 
under PD. But this is a contradiction because for some of the researchers who have 
moved to PD it was not profitable to do so. The reasoning is symmetric for the 
deviations from PD to PR in equilibrium. Stability of the equilibrium requires that the 
F(n
e) curve cuts the n
e/N line from above. This ensures that whenever an individual 
deviates from the equilibrium, moving from PD to PR, the share of individuals with π ≤ 
x (n
e – 1), i.e. those who find it profitable to operate under PD, is higher than the actual 
share of individuals working under PD after the move, viz. (n
e – 1)/N. Hence, the move 
is not profitable. Similarly, whenever an individual moves from PR to PD in equilibrium, 
the share of researchers with π ≤ x(n
e + 1) becomes smaller than the share of researchers 
who now work under PD, viz. (n
e + 1)/N. The stability conditions are then F(0| n
e – 1) > 
(n
e – 1)/N and F(0|n
e+ 1) < (n
e + 1)/N. Multiple equilibria are also possible. There may 
be more than one n
e that satisfies (1) with F(n) cutting n/N from above, as shown by 
Figure 1. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The share of researchers working under PD decreases if the economic 
profitability of research increases relatively to the researchers’ utility from their public 
contributions. This can be thought of as a first order stochastic downward shift in F(·) 
which would stem from an increase in π – x(n) for all the individuals. Likewise, a stronger 
taste for research would be represented by an upward shift in F as π – x(n) decreases for 
all the individuals. This raises n
e. Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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■ Instability of PD Knowledge Production. To see why the production of knowledge 
under PD is unstable, suppose that n
e is an equilibrium and v researchers working under 
PR coordinate to work under PD. If n
e is an equilibrium, then π > x(n
e + v), for at least 
one of these researchers, otherwise n
e + v would be an equilibrium. Yet, it is possible that 
x(n
e + v) + θ·X(n
e + v – 1) > π + θ·X(n
e – 1) for all the v researchers; viz., if the v 
researchers coordinate, they are better off than in equilibrium. To see this recall that x(n) 
≡ X(n) – X(n-1). Therefore x(n
e + v) + θ·X(n
e+v– 1) – θ·X(n










xn v j. But the expression in the summation sign is non-negative 
because x ≥ 0. Hence, this expression can be greater than π in spite of the fact that π > 
x(n
e + v). If the v researchers working under PR coordinate to work under PD, the system 
is unstable because at least one of them can find it profitable to deviate since he exhibits 
π > x(n
e + v). Once he deviates, at least one of the remaining v-1  researchers has an 
incentive to deviate because n
e + v –1 is not an equilibrium, and so on till all the v 
researchers have deviated. At that point nobody else has an incentive to deviate because 
n
e is an equilibrium.  
■ The GPL model.  Let B be an opportunity cost faced by an originator and any 
potential contributor to a project, with [B – x(n)] ∼ G(·|n). We assume that even if the 
contributors do not join the project they still enjoy θX(n) from the project if n 
researchers work on it under PD. That is, their indirect utility is B + θX(n). Let n
G and 
n
NG be the equilibrium number of contributors joining the project under PD if the 
originator launches the project, works under PD and attaches a GPL or not. Finally, let 
NG n  be the number of contributors under PD if the originator launches the project under 
PR (and cannot attach a GPL to it). Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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If the originator launches the project, works under PD and does not issue a GPL, 
the contributors working under PD will exhibit π ≤ x(n
NG+1) and B ≤ x(n
NG+1). If Γ(·) is 
the joint distribution function of π – x and B – x, in equilibrium we have Γ(0, 0 | n
NG) = 
n
NG/N. With no GPL, the condition becomes less restrictive, because only B ≤ x is 
required. As a result, with a GPL, G(0|n
NG) > n
NG/N. This will induce some researchers 
to join under PD, because the share of researchers with B ≤ x is smaller than the share of 
researchers actually working under PD, i.e. n
NG/N. Provided that the stability conditions 
discussed above hold, the movement towards PD will stop at n
G such that G(0|n
G) = 
n
G/N. This implies n
G ≥ n
NG, that is a GPL induces more researchers to work under PD. 
If the originator launches the project under PR, the contributors can still join 
under PD. These will be all those with π – x(
NG n  ) ≤ 0 and B – x (
NG n  ) ≤ 0 . The 
difference with the previous no-GPL case is only that the originator does not join the 
project under PD. More generally, the same reasoning as above applies here, and n
G ≥ 
NG n  . As a matter of fact, if n is large enough, 
NG n  ≈ n
NG. 
Given the behaviour of the contributors, will the originator who launches the 
project working under PD issue a GPL? With PD-GPL his utility will be 
x(n
G+1)+θX(n
G). With PD and no GPL it will be x(n
NG+1)+θX(n
NG). By using the fact 





NG). A sufficient condition for this inequality to hold is that θ ≥ 1. 
This follows from n
G ≥ n
NG and the fact that X(n) increases with n, which in turn follows 
from x(n) ≥ 0. Thus, if the originator chooses to work under PD, setting a GPL will be a 
dominant strategy unless θ is close to zero (i.e. the impact of the others’ behaviour is not 
that important) and some special conditions occur. For simplicity, we assume that θ is Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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large enough, and therefore choosing a GPL always dominates when the originator 
chooses PD.  
If the originator chooses PR his utility will be π + θX(
NG n  ). As a result, the 
originator will choose to work on the project under PD (and issue a GPL) if 
x(n
G+1)+θ·X(n
G) ≥ B, and x(n
G+1)+θ·X(n
G) ≥ π + θ·X(
NG n  ). If there was no GPL, the 
condition would be the same with n
NG in lieu of n
G. Since n
G ≥ n
NG, with no GPL the 
condition becomes more restrictive. As a result, the possibility to use a GPL implies not 
only that more researchers will join under PD, but also that more projects will be 
launched under PD with a GPL.  
  As discussed in the text, the GPL is least effective when there is a strong positive 
correlation between B and π. This implies that many individuals with small B tend to 
have a small π as well. As a result, the restriction π ≤ x associated with B ≤ x does not 
restrict the set of PD researchers much more than B ≤ x  alone, which means that n
G is 
close to n
NG, and the additional set of PD researchers created by the GPL is not large. In 
turn, this implies that the GPL does not encourage a more intensive coordination than 
without it.  
  The GPL raises the number of contributors working under PD in spite of the 
fact that the total number of contributors to the project decreases. To see this, assume 
for simplicity that x is roughly constant with respect to n, so that x(n
NG) ≈ x(n
G) ≡ x. 
Consider the following table Gambardella and Hall    November 2004 
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Researchers Set  Action under no GPL  Action under GPL 
B ≤ x; π ≤ x  Join under PD  Join under PD 
B ≤ x; π ≥ x  (π ≥ B)  Join under PR  Join under PD 
B ≥ x; π ≤ x  (π ≤ B)  Not join  Not join 
Join under PR if π ≥ B 
 
B ≥ x; π ≥ x 




Thus, with a GPL, some researchers who joined under PR switch to PD, while the 
opposite is not true. The researchers who no longer join the project with the GPL are 
only those who joined under PR. Thus, they do not affect n in equilibrium.  
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Table 1: Econometric Software Packages 











Research grants or own 
research  20 16  9.4  1979 
quasi-governmental 
organization  5 4  16.4 1974 
private (for profit)  5 5  0.8  1984 
Total or average  30 25  9.0  1979 
 







Full windows, icons, menus 
interface (WIMP)  60%  60% 
Interactive use possible  60%  68% 
Macro files can be executed  40%  84% 
Manipulate objects with 
icons/menus 60%  88% 
Generate interactive 
commands with icons/menus 20%  60% 
 
Table 3: Price Discrimination in 
Econometric Software 
Price discriminate?  No. of packages
by size or complexity  3 
academic/commercial 10 
no discrimination  2 
NA 2 
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One stable equilibrium (E)  Two stable equilibria (E1 and E2) 